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THE  EVENTS OF THE PAST TWO YEARS have marked a departure from the 
relative stability in international markets since World War II. The diffi- 
culties began with the deterioration in the United States merchandise  trade 
balance in 1971. Large movements of short-term capital also occurred as 
anxiety over the dollar increased. The result was imposition of an import 
surcharge and suspension of gold convertibility by the United States on 
August 15, 1971. Throughout the fall of  1971, the dollar depreciated on 
foreign exchange markets relative to  most  major currencies. With the 
Smithsonian agreement in December 1971, the U.S. import surcharge  was 
removed and a new set of fixed parities was agreed upon, with wider bands 
than had existed previously. In June 1972, a sterling crisis erupted, leading 
to a float of the British pound. Even though the monthly trade balance for 
the United States improved little in 1972, two events stimulated confidence 
in the dollar after the sterling crisis: Late in August, U.S. money market 
rates rose significantly, and the efforts of the United States to halt inflation 
appeared to be achieving some success while inflation was worsening in 
Western Europe.' 
However, late  1972 was marked by mounting apprehension over the 
strenorth  of  the  collar  Some  Western  Fiironean  couintries  hbenn  to  tirhten 
* I am indebted to the National Science Foundation for research  support (grant 
GS-35620)  and to David Klock and Carol  Nackenoff  for helpful  comments. 
1. "Treasury  and Federal  Reserve Foreign Exchange  Operations,"  Federal  Reserve 
Bulletin,  Vol. 59 (March 1973).  pp. 142-45. 
303 304  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1973 
their monetary policies.  Confidence in the dollar eroded further in the 
middle of December, when U.S. trade figures for November revealed that 
the monthly merchandise trade deficit had grown to $663 million from an 
average of $497 million for the previous six months. A number of factors 
reinforced  the pressure  on the dollar in January 1973: intensified  apprehen- 
sion over renewed inflationary  pressures  in the United States, a sharp drop 
in U.S.  stock prices, concern that U.S. interest rates might not rise suffi- 
ciently to maintain external balance, introduction of a two-tier market for 
the weakening Italian lira and the related floating upward of the Swiss 
franc, release of the December U.S. trade balance figures, which showed an- 
other bad month (ironically, the initially reported deficit of $563 million 
was later revised downward to  $441 million), and the release of German 
data indicating substantial growth in that nation's trade surplus during 
1972.2 In February the German mark reached its ceiling, forcing both 
American and German monetary authorities to intervene (on Friday, Feb- 
ruary 2, the last of the available mark balances held by the Federal Reserve 
were sold); and Chairman Wilbur D. Mills of the U.S. House Ways and 
Means Committee called for a further devaluation of the dollar and urged 
the convocation  of  an international monetary conference to  realign the 
major currencies.3  It is reported  that the German central bank bought more 
than $6 billion in an effort to prevent another unilateral revaluation of the 
mark, swelling its reserves to  the equivalent of  $32.4 billion by Friday, 
February  9.4 On Monday, February 12, U.S. Treasury  Secretary  George P. 
Shultz announced the 10  percent devaluation of the dollar and the govern- 
ment's understanding that the Japanese yen would temporarily  join those 
currencies then floating. The crisis continued into March, however, and 
exchange markets in  Europe were officially closed  during the  week of 
March 5-9 with the dollar quoted below its new floor rates.5 The result of 
these events has been the float that now prevails. 
What has been learned from the developments in foreign exchange mar- 
kets that culminated in the February 12 devaluation of the dollar? The 
lesson is that it is becoming increasingly difficult, if not  impossible, for 
2. Ibid.,  pp. 143-44; Wall  Street  Journal,  February  26, 1973,  p. 1; Economic  Indicators 
(January  1973), p. 23. 
3. "Treasury  and Federal  Reserve ...  Operations,"  p. 144, and Wall  Street  Journal, 
February  8, 1973, p. 5. 
4.  Wall  Street  Journal,  February  14, 1973, p. 3. 
5. "Treasury  and Federal  Reserve . . . Operations,"  p. 145. Stephen P. Magee  305 
central banks to maintain a fixed parity system when the official rates de- 
viate significantly from the market rates. The first reason is increased pri- 
vate capital mobility: The amount of liquid funds held by large multina- 
tional corporations is growing rapidly and may be sufficiently  large relative 
to the reserves of central banks to swamp the effects of intervention by na- 
tional monetary authorities in crises. A  recent study by the U.S.  Tariff 
Commission shows  that  at  the  end  of  1971, private institutions inter- 
nationally controlled some  $268 billion in short-term liquid assets.6 By 
comparison, the reserves of the world's major central banks equaled less 
than $68 billion. A second new factor in the foreign exchange markets is the 
presence of  rather substantial holdings of  foreign exchange reserves by 
Middle Eastern and African oil countries placed mostly in the Eurodollar 
market. These moneys moved very rapidly in the recent crisis from weak 
currencies into strong currencies.7  Such profit-maximizing behavior con- 
trasts with that of European central banks, who engage in counter-specula- 
tive activity. 
Short-run  Effects of Exchange Rate Changes on Trade 
This chronology of the recent crisis serves as a background for a discus- 
sion of the short-run  effects of exchange rate changes on trade based on the 
elasticities approach.8 
Two topics are treated in this section: "currency-contract  analysis" and 
the "pass-through" problem. Currency-contract analysis deals with that 
brief period immediately following a devaluation (or appreciation)  in which 
contracts negotiated prior to  the  change fall  due. As  used here, pass- 
through analysis refers to the behavior of international prices on contracts 
agreed upon after the devaluation has taken place but before it has effected 
significant changes in quantities. Thus, both topics are addressed to the 
6.  Wall  Street  Journal,  February  13, 1973, p. 2. 
7. The Wall  Street  Journal,  March 1, 1973, p. 1, cites one study showing  that of the 
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came from Middle  Eastern  and North African  countries. 
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short-run  price  effects  of devaluation  before  quantities  begin to respond. 
The  final  section  of the paper  will  deal  briefly  with  the initial  portion  of the 
quantity-adjustment  period. 
On both short-run  topics,  the press  has made  confusing  and misleading 
statements,  which  need  clarification.  Moreover,  the short-run  analysis  may 
shed  some  light  on the  empirical  question  of why  the  U.S. trade  balance  de- 
teriorated  so much  in 1972  despite  the devaluation  of the dollar  in 1971. 
Branson  reported  a year  ago that  both  the  Armington  and  Magee  models 
pointed  to a favorable  effect  of devaluation  within  at most two years.  On 
the other  hand,  Gerard  Adams  and  Lawrence  Klein-the self-styled  "elas- 
ticity  pessimists"-expected  no significant  improvement  in the U.S. trade 
balance  as a result  of devaluation.9  Developments  in 1972  disappointed  the 
expectations  of elasticity  optimists  and  adherents  to the  monetary  approach 
to the balance  of payments.'0  The annual  U.S. trade  balance  deteriorated 
from  a surplus  of $2.2  billion  in 1970  to deficits  of $2.7 billion  in 1971  and 
$6.8 billion  in 1972.11 
The  performance  in 1972  has been  explained  by several  factors.  The first 
argument  is that  the rapid  increase  in domestic  activity  in the United  States 
relative  to activity  abroad  in 1972  swamped  any favorable  effects  that the 
devaluation  might  have  generated.  The  importance  of the  level  of economic 
9. See William  H. Branson,  "The  Trade  Effects  of the 1971  Currency  Realignments," 
Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity  (1:1972), pp. 15-58, and, in the same volume, 
Lawrence  R. Klein, "Comments  and Discussion,"  pp. 59-65. Hereafter,  this document 
will be referred  to as BPEA, followed by the date. 
10. The monetarist  approach  argues  that the increased  price  of both exportables  and 
importables  in terms of the devaluing  country's  currency  will lead to a decline in the 
country's real balances. Efforts to rebuild these balances will result in flow excess 
demands  for money and flow excess supplies of goods and securities.  For the United 
States, no evidence  of the former  emerged,  although  there is the following evidence  on 
adjustments  in securities  markets. 
The 1971 devaluation of the dollar reduced the foreign currency price of  assets 
denominated  in dollars.  Net foreign purchases  of U.S. securities  jumped to $4.6 billion 
in 1972,  up from $2.3 billion  in 1971.  Two-thirds  of this rise  was due to increased  buying 
of U.S. stocks. Foreign purchases  of U.S. bonds also increased:  In 1972, foreigners 
purchased  $2.0 billion,  against  $1.2 billion  in 1971.  Similarly,  the dollar  price  of securities 
denominated  in foreign  currency  increased  when the dollar was devalued.  As a result, 
net U.S. purchases  of foreign securities  fell from $0.9 billion in 1971 to less than $0.6 
billion in 1972 (Wall Street Journal,  February  15, 1973, p. 3). As a result of the most 
recent  devaluation,  anxiety  over foreign  takeovers  of U.S. firms  rose (a reverse  Servan- 
Schreiber  effect). 
Thus,  while  the effect  of the 1971  devaluation  on trade  is open to question,  some stock 
adjustment  (albeit  infinitesimal)  has been made in the long-term  capital accounts in the 
expected  directions. 
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activity  as the key short-run  determinant  of trade flows has been well 
established.12  The relationship  between  the U.S. trade balance  and the 
differential  growth  of foreign  and U.S. industrial  production  from 1967  to 
1973  is shown  in Figure  1. In 1969  and early 1970,  the growth  of foreign 
industrial  activity  generally  strengthened  relative  to that of the United 
States,  with an accompanying  increase  in the U.S. trade balance.  From 
1970:2 to 1972:3,  the growth  of foreign  industrial  activity  moved down 
relative  to U.S. activity,  and  the U.S. trade  balance  fell substantially.  Thus, 
part of the explanation  for the deterioration  in the 1972  trade  balance  is 
simply  rapid  U.S. expansion  relative  to foreign  expansion. 
A second  explanation  of the 1972  experience  is that  the  expansion  of real 
exports  and the retardation  of real imports  occur only after substantial 
lags. Junz  and Rhomberg  have identified  at least five lags in the process 
between  changes  in exchange  rates  and  their  ultimate  effects  on real  trade: 
lags in recognition  of the changed  situation,  in the decision  to change  real 
variables,  in delivery  time,  in the replacement  of inventories  and  materials, 
and in production.13  Their  empirical  evidence  supports  lags of up to five 
years  in the effects  of exchange  rate  changes  on market  shares  of countries 
in world  trade. 
Qualitative  evidence  on lags has been presented  in several  areas.  Borg- 
Warner  Corporation  is reported  to export  many  highly  engineered  items  in 
which  buying  decisions  are  made  over  a fairly  long time.  For air  condition- 
ing compressors  for autos,  at least  a one-year  lead  time  is required  to put a 
12. This is confirmed  in most econometric  studies of trade flows. See William H. 
Branson, "The Balance of Payments in  1970," BPEA (1:1971), pp. 219-25; H.  S. 
Houthakker  and Stephen  P. Magee, "Income and Price Elasticities  in World Trade," 
Review of Economics  and Statistics, Vol. 51 (May 1969), pp. 111-25; and Arthur B. 
Laffer,  "Monetary  Policy and the Balance  of Payments,"  Journal  of Money, Credit  and 
Banking,  Vol. 4 (February  1972), pp. 13-22. A chart similar  to Figure 1 has been pub- 
lished by Arthur  B. Laffer  in "Do Devaluations  Really Help Trade?"  in the Wall  Street 
Journal,  February  5, 1973, p. 10, and shows an even closer relationship  between the 
trade balance  and relative  growth rates in gross national product  (on an annual basis) 
than is shown in Figure 1. It should be emphasized  that the casual empiricism  pursued 
here  should  be supplanted  by analysis  using a full-scale  model of world  trade  of the sort 
under  way  in Project  LINK. A final  observation  is that  the proper  functional  relationship 
is between  the flows of trade and the flows of income (or industrial  production).  Thus, 
relative  changes  in the activity flows should be related  to changes  in the trade  balance, 
rather  than the trade  balance  itself. This should be kept in mind in analyzing  Figure 1, 
where,  for pedagogical  reasons, I have plotted the trade balance. 
A,13.  Helen B. Junz and Rudolf R.  Rhomberg, "Price Competitiveness  in Export 
Trade Among Industrial  Countries,"  in American  Economic Association, Papers and 
Proceedings  of the Eighty-fifth  Annual  Meeting, 1972 (American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 
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Figure 1.  U.S. Trade Balance and Differential Growth  of Foreign and 
U.S. Industrial  Production, 1967-73 
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model  into production.  Makers  of complicated  production  machinery  also 
cite substantial  lags between  orders  and shipments.  Dow Chemical  has 
been cited as a company  that will probably  build facilities  in the United 
States  that might  have been built overseas  if the dollar  had not been de- 
valued.14 
t:  The implications  frequently  drawn  from the events  following  the 1971 
devaluation  of the dollar are that (1) improvement  in the trade  balance 
depends  on whether  the devaluation  affects  the real volume  of trade,  and 
(2) a trade  balance  must get worse after  a devaluation  before it can get 
better.  While some ex post support  can be found for these propositions, 
they are by no means  inevitable  theoretically.  Proposition  (2) implies  the 
widely  discussed  "J-curve"  of a country's  trade  balance  after  devaluation. 
The  idea  of the J-curve  has  been  developed  in light of the adverse  short-run 
movements  of the trade  balance  after  both the 1967  British  and the 1971 
U.S. devaluations.  The following  quotation  from the Wall  Street  Journal 
illustrates  the view: 
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Plotting  the  J-Curve 
The worsening  U.S. trade  deficit  in the months  after  devaluation  hasn't  really 
been  unexpected.  Economists  say  that  only in the long run are  international  trad- 
ing patterns  affected  by new currency  values. "Buying patterns don't change 
overnight  because  prices  have changed,"  a U.S. trade  expert  says. 
The effect on a nation's  trade caused by devaluation  of its currency  can be 
plotted  in what economists  call a J-curve,  because  the trade  picture  worsens  be- 
fore showing  improvement.  "But  when  devaluation  takes  hold," a British  official 
says, recalling  the pound's devaluation  in 1967, "the change can come quite 
suddenly."15 
The analysis of this report will emphasize that in the period before the 
quantities of  trade start adjusting to  a devaluation (that is,  during the 
currency-contract  and pass-through periods), there is no logical necessity 
for a country's trade balance to deteriorate, any more than for it to im- 
prove or remain constant. 
CURRENCY-CONTRACT  ANALYSIS 
I shall now develop a taxonomy of the possible effects on the U.S. trade 
balance of a devaluation of the dollar during the currency-contract  period. 
First examine the effect of a devaluation of the dollar on the value of 
U.S.  exports in both dollars ($) and foreign currencies (FC). Assume for 
simplicity that the foreign exchange rate before devaluation is $1 =  FC1. 
Suppose a U.S. exporter agrees to sell, and a foreign importer to buy, one 
hundred units of a product for $1 per unit or, equivalently, FC1 per unit. 
Assume that during the period between the time the contract is entered  into 
and the time final payment is made the United States devalues the dollar 
from $1/FC to $1.25/FC.  The important question after the devaluation is 
whether the contract is denominated in the foreign currency or in dollars. 
If the contract is denominated in foreign currency (alternative XFC), then 
the U.S. exporter receives FC100, which now equals $125, thus obtaining a 
$25 capital gain. In that case, the price of U.S. exports rises 25 percent in 
dollars and is unchanged in foreign currencies. 
However, if the contract is denominated in dollars (alternative  X$), U.S. 
exporters receive $100; but foreign importers pay only FC80 and have a 
capital gain of FC20 due to the dollar devaluation. 
Consider now the effect on U.S. imports  of the devaluation of the dollar. 
As before, the results depend on whether  the contract is denominated in the 
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foreign currency  (alternative  MFC) or dollars (alternative  M$). If an initial 
contract for one hundred units of imports is denominated in foreign cur- 
rency at FCI per unit, U.S. importers  must pay $125 after the devaluation, 
sustaining a capital loss of $25. If, on the other hand, the contract is de- 
nominated in dollars, U.S. importers pay $100 and foreign exporters get 
only FC80, thus absorbing a capital loss equal to FC20. 
The moral of the preceding analysis is that a seller in world markets 
prefers payment in currencies expected to strengthen; that is, he will wish 
to denominate export contracts in a currency expected to appreciate. But 
the preference of the buyer is just the reverse: The importer wishes to pay 
in currencies that are expected to weaken in order to get a capital gain 
or avoid a capital loss. 
The two  alternatives for exports and the two  for imports suggest an 
overall taxonomy of  four possible cases of contracting for exports and 
imports. These are shown in Table 1. Case 1, combining alternatives XFC 
and M$, assures an improvement in the U.S. trade balance, whether mea- 
sured in dollars or in foreign currency, since exports increase in dollars, 
while imports fall in foreign currency  (a bar over either X or M means it is 
unchanged with devaluation). Case 2, which combines alternatives XFC 
and MFC, involves no change in the U.S.  trade balance in foreign cur- 
rency. However, it goes up or down, or stays constant in dollars, depending 
on whether the initial situation was a surplus, deficit, or balance. Case 3, 
which combines X$ and M$, is similar: no change in dollars and a three- 
way possibility in foreign currencies. Case 4-the  combination of X$ and 
MFC-yields  an unambiguous deterioration: A capital loss is experienced 
on U.S. exports in foreign currency and on imports in dollars. 
Thus, the initial portion of the J-curve-the  decline in  the U.S.  trade 
balance measured in dollars in the currency-contract  period-is  inevitable 
only in case 4, and is possible in only one other case-case  2-providing 
U.S. trade was initially in deficit. To generalize, a necessary condition for 
the initial decline measured in dollars is that U.S. import contracts are in 
foreign currency. 
Even the mechanical classification system in Table  1 can help clarify 
some confusion in the press over currency contracts and devaluation. The 
following statement, made two days after the most recent devaluation of 
the dollar, is illustrative: 
Many  analysts  are  skeptical  that devaluation  will  significantly  narrow  this [U.S. 
trade] gap. In fact, the immediate  impact will be to worsen  the [U.S.] deficit. 0 
0 
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That's  because  goods contracted  for at pre-devaluation  prices  by U.S. importers 
will require  more dollars  in payment,  and exports  already  in the stream  of trade 
will earn  fewer  dollars.'6 
Three comments are in order. First, deterioration of the U.S. trade balance 
in dollars is not  inevitable: It occurs only in cases 2 and 4 in Table 1. 
Second, goods imported into the United States cost more in dollars only on 
that portion of contracts denominated in foreign currency. In general, the 
percentage increase in the dollar value of U.S. imports, %AM, as a result of 
a dollar devaluation, equals the summation across countries of the products 
of the following three variables: the share countryj takes of U.S. imports, 
s7, the proportion of contracts that is denominated in that country's cur- 
rency for exports to the United States, c7, and the proportional increase in 
the dollar value of the currency of countryj,  dj: 
(1)  SoAM =  E2  s7  c7dj(100). 
For example, if foreign importers responsible for three-tenths of U.S. im- 
ports have five-tenths of their exports to the United States contracted for in 
their own currencies, a devaluation of the dollar of 25 percent vis-'a-vis 
these countries would generate a 3.75 percent increase in the value of U.S. 
imports. Small values of any one of the variables s7, c7, and dj can make the 
increase in the value of U.S. imports from countryj small. Third, the state- 
ment in the quotation that "exports already in the stream of trade will earn 
fewer dollars" is simply false. There is no way in which the value of U.S. 
exports in dollars contracted for before devaluation can decrease. For con- 
tracts in foreign currencies (cases 1 and 2), U.S.  exports increase, while 
contracts in dollars exhibit no effect. As in the case of imports, the per- 
centage increase in the value of exports equals 
(2)  oAX=  s7cxdj(100). 
The condition under which the trade balance deteriorates in the currency- 
contract period following devaluation is that 
(3)  ,  (sxcrdXy?  -  sTcTdjMj)  <  0. 
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This condition is more likely to  obtain, the larger the share of import 
contracts relative to  export contracts denominated in foreign currencies 
(cj  >  c'); it also depends on the relation of these shares to  the patterns 
of deficits and devaluations. 
Thus far, the analysis has been mechanical and taxonomic. What eco- 
nomic analysis can be brought to bear on the most likely empirical cases? 
The currency  in which contracts are denominated is likely to be determined 
by the relative market power of traders. Price makers would tend to de- 
nominate contracts so that they would get the capital gain (or minimize the 
capital loss) on anticipated devaluations. In the absence of market power 
on either side, the results are ambiguous and adjustments would probably 
show up in timing, with a slowing of U.S.  exports before an anticipated 
devaluation of the dollar (as U.S. exporters and foreigners waited to obtain 
a capital gain) and an acceleration of U.S. imports (as both sides attempted 
to avoid possible capital losses). 
Since countries tend to  be more specialized in  their exports than in 
imports, they might be expected to have more market power in their export 
markets than in import markets. In terms of the polar cases considered in 
Table 1, case 2 thus might be the most likely empirically. For the United 
States, this suggestion implies a deterioration  in the trade balance expressed 
in dollars, since the devaluation after August 15, 1971, occurred  in a deficit 
situation. I could find little qualitative or survey evidence on the denomina- 
tion of contracts. The multinational corporations presumably possess mar- 
ket power and speculate through currency contracts. For example, Dow 
Chemical's division in Midland, Michigan, which exported $275 million 
in plastics and chemicals last year, reports that it writes contracts and sells 
in  foreign currencies.17 This  practice indicates profit maximization on 
Dow's part, since the last two devaluations of the dollar would have given 
it capital gains. A crude examination of data on U.S. import and export 
prices might give another clue as to the most likely empirical case. If U.S. 
export contracts are denominated in foreign currencies, a large increase in 
U.S.  export prices in dollars would occur immediately, while if they  are 
denominated in dollars, there would be no  significant change in  export 
prices immediately after devaluation. 
As  might be expected, the price data are not  conclusive. Export unit 
values increased by 3.2 percent for all of 1971 and by 3.3 percent for all of 
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1972.18  However, in September 1971, they rose 0.7 percent and in October, 
1.1 percent. If most contracts are for ninety days, the bulk of contracts in 
effect on August 15 would have fallen due in September and October. At 
mid-December, the Smithsonian accord was reached and the dollar was 
devalued again relative to the prevailing market rates for several curren- 
cies. In January 1972, U.S. export prices rose 0.4 percent, and in February, 
1.1 percent (they fell by 0.9 percent in March, however). I interpret the 
rises as weak and somewhat ambiguous confirmation of the idea that many 
U.S. export contracts are denominated in foreign currency. 
For U.S. imports, foreign currency contracts would imply rapid dollar 
price increases immediately after the devaluation, while contracts denomi- 
nated in dollars would imply no change then. For a frame of  reference, 
import unit values increased by 5.2 percent in 1971 and by 7.5 percent in 
1972. In September 1971, import prices fell by 0.5 percent, but they rose by 
2.0 percent in October and by 0.5 percent in November. After the Smith- 
sonian devaluation, U.S. import prices rose by 0.4 percent in January 1972, 
2.4 percent in February, and 1.8 percent in March. These are above average 
increases, suggesting  that many U.S. import contracts are also denominated 
in foreign currency; they also conform to the price-maker argument dis- 
cussed above.19 
Thus, there is the mild suggestion that, of the polar cases in Table 1, 
case 2 may be the most likely one when there is expectation of a dollar deval- 
uation-that  is, both export and import contracts for the United States 
tend to be denominated largely in foreign currency. But such a conclusion 
must be tentative in light of the widely held belief that most trade contracts 
are in dollars and because dock strikes and other special factors may have 
distorted the evidence for the fall of 1971. 
These results indicate that the U.S.  trade balance might deteriorate in 
dollars in the currency-contract  period after dollar devaluation-tracing  a 
declining segment of the J-curve-because  of the initial deficit and some 
rather complicated market forces, and not because of  some theoretical 
18. The source  of the U.S. unit  value  series  used  here  is the Survey  of Current  Business, 
Vol. 52 (March 1972), and Vol. 53 (January  1973) and (April 1973), p. S23 in each. 
19. A final implication of the currency-contract  approach is that if the last two 
devaluations  of the dollar  cause it to be undervalued  at some future  date and revalued, 
a profit-maximizing  strategy  for U.S. exporters  would be to switch from denominating 
contracts  in foreign  currency  to denominating  them in dollars.  Similarly,  U.S. importers 
would wish to switch from denominating  contracts  in dollars  to denominating  them in 
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inevitability. That deterioration is consistent with the actual decline in the 
quarterly  U.S. trade balance from 1971:3 to  1972:2 depicted in Figure 1, 
although the activity variable could account for some of that movement. 
PASS-THROUGH 
In  Branson's terminology,  "successful" pass-through means that  "in 
devaluing countries the domestic currency  price index of imports should be 
rising substantially, while in upvaluing countries it should be falling."20 
Pass-through is important because buyers have incentives to  alter their 
purchases of foreign goods only to the extent that the prices of these goods 
change in terms of their domestic currency  following a devaluation. That in 
turn depends on the willingness of exporters to allow the devaluation to 
affect the prices they charge for their products, measured in terms of the 
buyer's currency. Branson concluded regretfully that these changes were 
not taking place in full after August 1971: 
. . . Japanese  and German  exporters  are, to a large  extent,  not passing  through 
the exchange  rate changes,  but rather  are holding dollar prices fairly constant 
while home currency  prices fall a bit....  This means that, in addition  to the 
possibility  of a short-run  increase  in import  payments  in U.S. dollars  due to the 
short-run  inelasticity  of demand,  the favorable  effects  of the devaluation  on the 
import  side may take substantially  longer  to appear  than econometric  evidence 
on normal  price lags would suggest.21 
Thus successful pass-through in Branson's sense means a larger and 
prompter response in the quantities of trade, which would abet the success 
of the devaluation in improving the trade balance, providing the Marshall- 
Lerner conditions are met. But the implications of pass-through for the 
very short run, in which quantities are essentially fixed, is very different: 
"Successful" pass-through implies an "unsuccessful" result for the trade 
balance in that brief interval. 
I shall analyze pass-through in the brief period following devaluations 
in which it can be assumed that the quantities of exports and imports have 
not  yet had time to  adjust. The constancy of  quantities in that "pass- 
through period" can result from either of two  situations. First, supply 
might be perfectly inelastic for a while because exporters cannot instantly 
alter their output or their sales abroad. Alternatively, demand might be 
20. "Trade  Effects,"  p. 53. 
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perfectly inelastic because importers require time  to  substitute among 
commodities and to change their flow of orders. 
Consider the situation in which the supply of U.S.  exports is perfectly 
inelastic for some interval after a devaluation of the dollar, while demand 
has some elasticity. The demand curve of foreign buyers for U.S.  goods 
would be unchanged in terms of their own currency, and therefore the 
price in dollars would be driven up by the amount of the devaluation. Thus 
there would be no pass-through of the devaluation into lower prices of 
U.S. exports measured in foreign currencies. On the other hand, if demand 
is completely inelastic while supply has some elasticity, the dollar price of 
U.S. exports would not change and the price in foreign currency  would fall, 
yielding full pass-through. For U.S.  imports, perfectly inelastic demand 
again means that the  devaluation is  passed through into  the prices of 
buyers-the  dollar price (and, with fixed quantities, the total value) of im- 
ports rises by the full amount of the devaluation. On the other hand, inelas- 
tic supply implies no pass-through-the  dollar price of imports remains 
unchanged as the foreign currency  price of U.S. imports falls. 
As in the currency-contract  case, there are four possible combinations of 
results-two  each on the side of imports and exports. These are shown in 
Table 2, which is the equivalent for the pass-through period of the Table 1 
taxonomy for the currency-contract  period. 
The worst result for the U.S. trade balance in the pass-through period is 
case 4, which has full pass-through on both sides. In that case, the U.S. 
trade balance deteriorates in both dollars and foreign currencies precisely 
because foreign suppliers  absorb none of the loss due to the dollar devalua- 
tion in their profit margins, while U.S. exporters exploit none of the gain 
by raising the dollar price of their products. What may be most favorable 
for the quantity-adjustment  period is least favorable for the pass-through 
period. On the other hand, the absence of any pass-through in the period 
in which quantities are fixed leads to case 1, which assures improvement in 
the U.S. trade balance after a dollar devaluation. 
Consider the following statement: 
Another  reason  for the disappointing  lack of impact  of past exchange-rate  ad- 
justments  has been  that  they weren't  always  reflected  in the final  prices  of exports 
and imports.  For example,  following  the last upward  valuation  of the Japanese 
yen, many  Japanese  exporters  simply  absorbed  the increase,  reducing  their  profit 
margins  instead  of raising  prices.  And many American  international  companies 
took the last dollar  devaluation  as an opportunity  to increase  the profit  margins 
of their  overseas  affiliates  instead  of cutting  prices.22 
22.  Wall  Street  Journal,  February  14, 1973, p. 13. 4-  G  WBo 
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For U.S. imports, this means that payments in dollars are constant while 
payments in foreign currency  fall. For exports, there is no change in dollars 
or in foreign currency  since the American corporation still quotes the same 
dollar price for the exports to the subsidiary  and it reports the same foreign 
currency  price to the customs authorities abroad. (The increased payment 
to the United States in dollars occurs only when foreign earnings are re- 
patriated: This helps the current account, but not the trade balance.) Thus, 
the trade balance is constant in dollars and improves in foreign currency. If 
the U.S. export transaction had been at arm's length, dollar payments for 
U.S. exports would have increased, leading to case 1 in Table 2,23 the best 
possible case for the United States.24 
Evidence was cited earlier that Japanese exporters were permitting siz- 
able decreases in the yen prices of their goods sent to the United  States. 
This practice will minimize the short-run increase in the dollar value of 
U.S. imports. The following evidence indicates that sizable capital gains on 
exports can be expected as a result of the devaluations: 
Only about one-third  of American  products exported  to West Germany,  for 
instance,  cost less in marks,  a U.S. embassy  trade  official  says.  Although  the mark 
was revalued  upward  by 13.57%  against  the dollar,  most exporters  continue  to 
charge  their German  customers  the same prices  as before devaluation.  Thus, in 
effect,  they are either  raising  their own profits  or retaining  margins  that would 
have been pared  by rising  costs.25 
If these two small bits of evidence permit generalizations, case 1 in Table 1 
appears the most likely case empirically (that is, both export and import 
supply are relatively inelastic in the short run). Thus, the U.S. trade bal- 
ance should improve in the (fixed-quantity) pass-through period. 
The Quantity-adjustment  Period 
What can be expected once quantities start to adjust?  Figure 2 shows the 
supply and demand for U.S. exports expressed in dollars (2a) and foreign 
currency (2b), as well as for imports in dollars (2c) and foreign currency 
23. While the quotation dealt with sales from foreign affiliates,  I have translated 
them into exports  so that they fit the analysis  in Table 2. 
24. Using "best" here implies a mercantile,  and not necessarily  a welfare, point of 
view with regard  to the trade balance. 
25.  Wall Street Journal, December  18, 1972, p.  1. Stephen P. Mazee  319 
(2d). In all these cases the equilibrium prior to devaluation is denoted by 
point E. The currency-contract  and pass-through periods analyzed above 
may be viewed as the intervals in which quantities remain fixed at either 
QXo or QMo. In the currency-contract  period, the price either stays at E or 
moves straight up or down to E$ or Ef, depending on whether  the contracts 
are denominated in dollars or in foreign currencies,  respectively. Similarly, 
in the pass-through period the situation may be at E, Ef, or E$, depending 
on whether the constancy of quantities is the result of perfectly inelastic 
supply or perfectly inelastic demand over that interval. In the pass-through 
period, if export supply is perfectly inelastic, the dollar price of U.S.  ex- 
ports rises to Ef in Figure 2a while the foreign currency  price stays at E in 
Figure 2b; if export demand is inelastic, the dollar prices remain at E in 2a 
and the foreign currency prices fall to E$ in 2b. The reverse is true for in- 
elastic import supply (dollar prices stay at E in 2c and foreign currency 
prices fall to E$ in 2d) and inelastic import demand (dollar prices rise to Ef 
in 2c and foreign currency prices stay constant at E in 2d). An important 
point here is that trade balance behavior and the path of adjustment  in the 
quantity-adjustment  period depend on what happened in the pass-through 
period. Since case 1 was found to be a likely possibility in the pass-through 
period, it is worth examining in some detail. 
Consider the U.S. trade balance in dollars. Case 1 of Table 2 corresponds 
to a short-run  increase in export prices to Ef in Figure 2a and no change in 
import prices at E in Figure 2c. The quantities of exports start increasing 
as the vertical short-run  supply curve for exports begins to rotate clockwise 
through point E in Figure 2a. Whether the value of exports increases or 
decreases depends on the elasticity of the short-run demand curve. 
There is some persuasive evidence that the short-run demand curve is 
inelastic and its rotation takes a fairly long time. Thus, as quantities begin 
to adjust, the dollar value of U.S. exports is likely to decline. The quantities 
of imports will start to decline as a result of devaluation after the currency- 
contract-pass-through period. Again, assume that the demand for imports 
is inelastic. Rotation  of  the previously vertical supply curves S  and  S' 
through E in Figure 2c results in an increased dollar payment for imports. 
As a result, based on the assumptions of what occurred  in the pass-through 
period, the expectation might be  for  a deterioration in  the  U.S.  trade 
balance early in the quantity-adjustment  period. 
The preceding analysis is very tentative since the adjustment from one 42  rA~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4 
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equilibrium point (E) to another (E') is a complicated matter: Almost any 
pattern of movement can occur with little variation in the plausibility of 
the assumptions. Empirical verification of the results for the pass-through 
and quantity-adjustment  periods is difficult here since a fairly sophisticated 
model is required  to determine when the pass-through period ends and the 
quantity-adjustment  period begins. It is worth noting that the currency- 
contract period for the Smithsonian dollar devaluation probably ended at 
the end of the first quarter of 1972. Thereafter  there was a trend improve- 
ment in the U.S. trade balance until October. The average monthly trade 
balance for November 1972, through February 1973, was disappointingly 
below trend. 
These data are not inconsistent with the hypothesized deterioration in 
the U.S.  trade balance during the currency-contract  period (case 2), im- 
provement during a hypothetical pass-through  period from March through 
October 1972 (as implied in case 1), and a subsequent decline early in the 
quantity-adjustment  period. However, this conclusion was drawn in the 
absence of a systematic examination of the quantity side, the data may have 
been affected by special factors, and the results may be influenced by move- 
ments of the trade balance in the direction predicted  by the activity variable 
in Figure 1 since 1971:4. 
The Emergence  of the W-Curve 
The purpose of this paper has been to examine in some detail the possible 
movements in a country's trade balance after devaluation. The short-run 
adjustment process was divided into  three parts: the  currency-contract 
period, the pass-through period, and the quantity-adjustment  period. Most 
of the analysis dealt with the first two periods. Theoretically, the trade 
balance can go either way in each period. Thus, in addition to J-curves, 
I-, L-, M-, N-, V-, and W-curves, plus their inversions, might be a minimum 
for a proper alphabet-soup analysis of the short-run  trade effects of devalu- 
ation.26 I hypothesized that for the 1971 dollar devaluations, some likely 
empirical results were deterioration during the currency-contract period, 
improvement during the pass-through period, and further deterioration in 
26. Some of these  require  nonmonotonicity  of effects  on the trade  balance  during  the 
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the early part of the quantity-adjustment  period. If this analysis is correct 
and if devaluation, other things equal, eventually leads to an improvement 
in the U.S. trade balance, a W-curve merits some investigation. 
Discussion 
SEVERAL  PARTICIPANTS  COMMENTED on  Magee's interpretation of  the 
currency speculations and the ensuing devaluation early in  1973. Walter 
Salant distinguished  between two types of "rational" speculation: one kind 
justified by nonexpectational or objective factors, which can be rational for 
speculators as a group; and another based on expectations of what other 
speculators will do, which can be rational for any individual speculator who 
correctly assesses the prevailing mood. 
Lawrence Krause argued that the speculation of early 1973 was quite 
rational in the first sense as a response to a fundamental disequilibrium  for 
the Japanese yen, if not for the dollar. In his judgment, the tranquillity of 
world money markets late in 1972 was predicated on confident expectation 
that the yen would be appreciated shortly after the Japanese elections. 
When it subsequently became clear that the Japanese had no intention of 
revaluing, the stage was set for a currency crisis. Paul Samuelson added 
that Japanese experts had been predicting a change in the exchange ratio 
between dollars and yen for many months; they had become "elasticity 
pessimists," concluding that the adjustments to the Smithsonian revalua- 
tion had been essentially completed by late in 1972, and had failed to re- 
store equilibrium.  Thus, many transactiohs of Japan with the United States 
were conducted with a revalued exchange rate in mind;  this led  to  the 
kinds of anticipatory transactions that Magee discusses. But Samuelson 
noted that such anticipatory behavior can result in a reverse J-effect  for an 
appreciating  country, with its surplus exaggerated  shortly before the change 
in exchange rates, and the deterioration exaggerated for an interval there- 
after. 
Concerning the more immediate causes of the dollar devaluation, Sam- 
uelson pointed to  the U.S.  decision to relax wage-price controls, which 
evoked a strong negative reaction abroad. The proclamations of some U.S. 
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In general,  Samuelson  doubted  that  bootstrap  speculation-with  no objec- 
tive basis-would significantly  alter exchange  rates.  He noted that inter- 
national  traders  and financiers  have had strong  objective  reasons  to take 
bearish  positions  on the dollar  throughout  the past dozen years,  and the 
dollar  has been  chronically  weak. 
Samuelson,  Alan Greenspan,  and Frank  Schiff  questioned  Magee's  em- 
phasis  on the three-  or four-to-one  ratio of mobile  assets  held privately  to 
those  held  by central  banks.  Samuelson  saw  no way  to appraise  the safety, 
normality,  or optimality  of any particular  ratio of this type. On the other 
hand,  several  agreed  that a fixed  parity  system  is increasingly  crisis-prone. 
Greenspan  suggested  that the rapid  growth  of privately  held liquid  assets 
deserved  stress,  since  it introduced  a dynamic  volatility  into currency  mar- 
kets.  Schiff  felt  that  the $268  billion  estimate  of privately  held  foreign  liquid 
assets  was  highly  questionable  as a measure  of "mobile"  funds,  noting,  for 
example,  that it omitted  the possibility  of money  flowing  out of U.S. do- 
mestic  holdings.  He thought  that  the  Smithsonian  agreement  had  convinced 
the world  financial  community  that major  changes  in exchange  rates  can 
occur,  increasing  the sensitivity  of responses  to uncertainties.  This greater 
sensitivity  could  be even  more  important  than  the growth  in the quantity  of 
mobile  funds. 
On the question  of contract  denomination,  Schiff  reported  hearing  of a 
number  of companies  that have recently  switched  both their  import  and 
export  contracts  into  foreign  currency  denominations.  These  reports  tended 
to support  Magee's  inferences  about the currency-contract  period.  John 
Kareken  doubted  that the denomination  of contracts  could be uniquely 
linked  to market  power.  A monopolist  might  use his market  power  fully  in 
setting  the price  in terms  of a given  currency,  and then  have  no extra  bar- 
gaining  power  to exact a further  concession  in terms of the currency  in 
which  the contract  is to be denominated. 
Walter Salant accepted  Magee's conclusion  that the presence  of the 
J-curve  effect  depends  partly  on the currency  in which  past contracts  are 
denominated  (what  Magee  called  the "contract"  problem);  but he empha- 
sized  that  the currency  in which  prices  are  quoted  is irrelevant  to contracts 
made after  the devaluation  (the "pass-through"  problem).  Whatever  the 
currency  in which  prices  were previously  being quoted,  they presumably 
will  be changed  to take  into account  the effects  of the exchange  rate  change 
on demand,  on the seller's  costs, and on competition  from  other  suppliers. 
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contract problem. Further, Salant noted that the market power of a coun- 
try selling to  a devaluing country, which was the  one economic factor 
included in Magee's analysis of the pass-through problem, does not depend 
on the degree to which the selling country specializes in that product. Its 
market power depends on the degree of competition in selling the product, 
both among its own sellers and between them and seliers of other countries. 
Moreover, in the absence of competition it could have great market power 
even without specialization. Thus, a country's specialization is neither a 
sufficient  nor a necessary condition for market power. 
On another issue, Salant wondered whether the relationship between 
differential  growth rates and the trade balance depicted in Magee's Figure 1 
had held up prior to  1967. Magee replied that the relationship was also 
close between 1960 and 1967. Hendrik Houthakker felt that a scatter dia- 
gram (or  some  other more analytical presentation) of  that relationship 
would be more illuminating than the graphical presentation that had been 
offered. 